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Meg	Smith	
Honors	Project	
The	Communicability	of	Nature:	Redefining	Nature’s	Voice	
	 How	do	we	experience	nature?	In	what	way	can	we	find	ourselves	at	one	
with	nature,	immersed	in	the	experience	of	nature,	and	still	allow	nature	a	level	of	
healthy	“otherness,”	of	individual	separation?	Writers,	scientists,	and	lost	people	
have	long	gone	to	the	wilderness,	to	nature,	in	search	of	answers	to	life’s	mysteries.	
In	effect	it	has	become	a	destination,	a	place	apart	from	humans,	where	it	exists	only	
as	a	haven	and	place	of	meditation.	Nature	has	lost	its	own	individuality,	its	sense	of	
presence	as	an	entity	in	and	of	itself.	When	we	seek	nature	in	order	to	look	for	
answers,	to	communicate	with	it	as	a	guide	for	life,	we	fail	to	see	it	as	an	
independent	presence.	Instead,	there	is	the	sense	that	nature	speaks	“human”	and	
tells	us	all	of	its	secrets,	which,	of	course,	relate	to	human	beings;	it	is	perceived	as	
unlocked.	
	 The	perception	of	nature	as	wide-open,	unlocked,	can	been	seen	in	many	of	
the	major	literary	movements.	William	Wordsworth,	a	Romantic	poet,	saw	nature	as	
simply	the	answer	to	life’s	riddles,	a	road	map	on	how	to	live	life	as	a	human.	He	
treated	nature	as	the	destination	for	his	contemplations,	a	mirror	where	he	might	
learn	about	himself.	In	a	slightly	different	way,	Henry	David	Thoreau,	a	
Transcendentalist	writer,	combined	the	mirror-view	of	nature	with	a	more	healthy	
respect	of	its	mystifying	otherness,	allowing	it	secrets	he	couldn’t	unlock.	However,	
from	that	otherness	he	creates	a	dangerous	and	inhibiting	divide	between	nature	
and	humanity.	But,	a	more	modern	poet,	Wyslawa	Szymborska	admired	the	
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unreachability	of	nature	through	human	communication.	Nature,	in	order	to	be	
given	the	respect	as	an	individual	entity,	must	be	approached	on	its	own	language	
terms,	not	those	proscribed	by	human	communication.	Moving	beyond	socially	
defined	rules	of	language	will	allow	for	a	closer	connection	with	nature;	one	takes	
into	consideration	new	forms	of	language	and	validates	the	individual	existence	and	
presence	of	nature.		
	 Starting	not	from	the	beginning,	but	at	least	from	the	Romantics,	
Wordsworth’s	Book	Fourteen	of	The	Prelude	offers	up	an	early	conception	of	nature	
and	sublimity.	He	writes	of	climbing	Mount	Snowdon	at	night,	seeing	“The	Moon	
hung	naked	in	a	firmament/	Of	azure	without	cloud,	and	at	my	feet/	Rested	a	silent	
sea	of	hoary	mist./	A	hundred	hills	their	dusky	backs	upheaved/	All	over	this	still	
Ocean”	(Wordsworth	378).	His	language	immediately	turns	to	images	of	vastness,	
describing	the	mist	as	large	as	a	“sea”	and	the	many	hills	as	part	of	a	large	“Ocean.”	
However,	he	doesn’t	seem	as	overwhelmed	by	the	majesty	of	the	sublime	view	in	
front	of	him	as	some	other	poets	who	come	later	(like	Thoreau).	He	still	sees	this	
incredible	moonscape	as	resting	“at	[his]	feet,”	symbolically	placing	himself	above	
the	scene.	Here	he	“beheld	the	emblem	of	a	Mind/	That	feeds	upon	infinity,	that	
broods/	Over	the	dark	abyss”	(Wordsworth	378).	Instead	of	becoming	
overwhelmed	with	wonder	and	fear	at	the	vista	before	him,	he	sees	the	markings	of	
a	mind,	or	person,	that	thrives	in	the	face	of	such	sublimity,	or	“infinity”;	a	person	
becoming	empowered,	not	minimized,	by	the	incomprehensible.	A	mind	of	that	
caliber	is	not	available	to	all,	so	“Nature”	puts	forth	“That	mutual	domination	which	
she	loves/	To	exert	upon	the	face	of	outward	things,/	So	moulded,	joined,	
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abstracted;	so	endowed/	With	interchangeable	supremacy,/	That	Men	least	
sensitive	see,	hear,	perceive,/	And	cannot	chuse	but	feel”	(Wordsworth	379).	For	
those	less	intelligent,	less	aware,	men,	nature	creates	the	overwhelming	terror	and	
joy	of	the	sublime	as	a	way	of	forcing	them	to	feel	the	“glorious	faculty/	That	higher	
minds	bear	with	them	as	their	own”	(Wordsworth	379).	If	you	are	of	a	better	stock,	
like	Wordsworth	himself,	the	sublime	is	not	fear	inducing,	but	nourishing,	and	feeds	
the	mind’s	imagination.	From	“whose	solemn	temple	[he]	received/	[His]	earliest	
visitation”	he	learned	and	never	“did	ever	yield,/	Wilfully,	to	mean	cares	of	low	
pursuits;”	(Wordsworth	380).	The	power	of	nature	only	served	to	enhance	his	
“higher	mind”	and	teach	him	to	avoid	the	lowly	pursuits	of	the	body,	because	that	
base	experience	is	left	for	those	“men	least	sensitive.”	In	this	respect,	nature’s	power	
was	a	sort	of	divinity,	teaching	about	how	to	live	and	giving	spiritual	guidance.		
	 For	Wordsworth,	nature	at	its	most	sublime	communicates	to	him	through	
his	mind,	acting	as	a	sort	of	food	to	strengthen	him	to	live	a	better	life.	In	this	way,	as	
William	Cronon	describes	it	in	“The	Trouble	With	Wilderness,”	now	the	“mountain	
[is]	as	cathedral”	(Cronon	75),	it	is	a	sort	of	church	or	god.	For	the	Romantics,	
“sublime	landscapes	were	those	rare	places	on	earth	where	one	had	more	chance	
than	elsewhere	to	glimpse	the	face	of	God”	and	He	was	easily	accessed	“in	those	
vast,	powerful	landscapes	where	one	could	not	help	feeling	insignificant	and	being	
reminded	of	one's	own	mortality”	(Cronon	75).	While	I	can’t	argue	with	Cronon’s	
sense	that	the	sublime	places	on	our	planet	are	where	the	Romantics	felt	most	
assured	of	seeing	God,	I	can	argue	with	his	sense	that	at	those	places	all	the	
Romantics	felt	“insignificant”	and	“reminded	of	[their]	own	mortality.”	Wordsworth	
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admired	the	scene	before	him	on	Mount	Snowdon,	but	instead	of	feeling	
insignificant,	he	felt	righteous,	overly	convinced	of	his	own	intellectual	prowess	and	
understanding	of	what	God	has	put	before	him.	In	his	temple,	he	is	not	awed	before	
the	power	of	a	mighty	being,	but	sees	himself	as	master	of	what’s	before	him,	master	
of	a	sublime	nature.	In	turning	the	mountain	into	a	temple,	he	takes	away	the	
mountain	as	itself,	a	mountain,	and	places	it	in	his	own	terms,	in	his	comfort	zone.	
Once	nature	is	now	understandable,	a	temple	in	which	Wordsworth	feels	
comfortable,	it	is	conquerable	and	loses	its	mysterious	sublime	power.		
Another	important	aspect	of	Wordsworth’s	sublime	is	its	insistence	on	the	
spirit	and	the	mind	(and	its	judgmental	renunciation	of	the	body).	Any	sense	that	
nature	might	communicate	with	him	bodily,	through	physical	sensation,	is	relegated	
to	the	more	lowly	minds,	denigrated	below	a	communication	of	the	mind.	While	I	do	
appreciate	that	Wordsworth	allows	nature	the	ability	to	communicate	through	the	
mind,	he	doesn’t	seem	to	actually	be	listening.	Instead,	Wordsworth	finds	in	the	
sublime	exactly	what	he	wants	to	find,	effectively	silencing	it.	Because	he	doesn’t	
“hear”	nature,	but	only	the	thoughts	he	placed	there	to	find,	nature	has	lost	any	
power	of	communication	he	might	have	accidently	allowed	it.	Nature	is	not	an	entity	
in	and	of	itself,	a	being	that	can	communicate	with	its	own	will,	but	is	instead	a	
temple	where	Wordsworth	might	learn	about	life.	He	disregards	any	real	way	that	
nature	might	have	to	communicate	with	him,	namely	through	bodily	experience,	and	
inserts	a	way	that	enhances	his	own	intellect	and	places	him	in	a	category	of	men	
able	to	“hear”	nature.	By	mocking	the	physicality	of	nature,	Wordsworth	seems	to	
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take	away	its	power,	reducing	it	to	mute	place	of	contemplation	and	not	a	body	
capable	of	exerting	an	effect	on	another	body.		
	 As	such,	Wordsworth’s	sublime	is	painfully	selfish,	focusing	not	on	the	power	
of	nature,	but	on	his	own	mind--	a	mind	capable	of	accepting	and	living	off	of	the	
vast	“infinity”	shown	him	that	night	on	Mount	Snowdon.	As	Christopher	Hitt	
recognizes	in	his	essay,	“Toward	an	Ecological	Sublime,”	“This	is	exemplary	of	what	
Keats	(despite	having	never	seen	The	Prelude)	was	famously	to	call	Wordsworth’s	
‘egotistical	sublime’”	(Hitt	608).	In	this	version	of	the	sublime,	the	final	phase	of	the	
sublime	is	one	in	which	the	power	of	the	individual	is	reinforced,	not	diminished,	in	
the	face	of	a	grande	force	of	nature.	Hitt	continues,	““Crudely	put,	the	contradiction	
of	the	sublime	is	that	it	has	tended	to	include	both	humbling	fear	and	ennobling	
validation	for	the	perceiving	subject.”	(606).	Wordsworth	does	not	really	see	nature	
at	any	point	in	his	hike	up	the	mountain,	but	goes	there	looking	for	self-validation,	a	
way	in	which	to	see	himself	as	equal	and	up	to	the	task	of	understanding	the	
sublime.	Nature	is	merely	a	mirror,	a	place	for	him	to	find	exactly	what	he	wants	to	
see.	He	finds	himself	a	man	of	a	“higher	mind,”	and	extracts	a	large	amount	of	
knowledge	about	love	and	pain	from	the	experience:	“to	early	intercourse/	In	
presence	of	sublime	or	beautiful	forms/	With	the	adverse	principle	of	pain	and	joy--
/	Evil,	as	one	is	rashly	named	by	men/	Who	know	not	what	they	speak”	
(Wordsworth	380).	He	believes	he	has	somehow	reconciled	the	paradox	of	“pain	
and	joy,”	finding	in	himself	a	mind	capable	of	understanding	the	teachings	of	nature	
and	of	the	sublime.		
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	 Henry	David	Thoreau,	a	man	of	a	different	era	but	with	a	love	of	nature	
writing,	also	wrote	about	his	experience	of	the	sublime	in	nature,	although	with	a	bit	
of	a	twist.	Unlike	the	blatant	self-validation	of	Wordsworth’s	nature	poetry,	Thoreau	
does	feel	himself	ultimately	minimized	by	the	scale	of	Mount	Ktaadn	in	his	book,	The	
Maine	Woods.	In	Part	6,	while	describing	the	scene	before	him,	he	seems	to	lose	his	
fluency,	opting	for	a	series	of	exclamations	in	the	attempt	to	describe	his	sublime	
moment:		
I	fear	not	spirits,	ghosts,	of	which	I	am	one,	—	that	my	body	
might,	—	but	I	fear	bodies,	I	tremble	to	meet	them.	What	is	this	
Titan	that	has	possession	of	me?	Talk	of	mysteries!	—	Think	of	
our	life	in	nature,	—	daily	to	be	shown	matter,	to	come	in	
contact	with	it,	—	rocks,	trees,	wind	on	our	cheeks!	
The	solid	earth!	The	actual	world!	the	common	sense!	Contact!	
Contact!	Who	are	we?	where	are	we?	(The	Maine	Woods	64)	
Here	Thoreau	is	thrown	into	inarticulation	as	he	struggles	to	understand	the	
immensity	of	the	mountain.	He	rightly	understands	the	“other”	he	has	just	stumbled	
onto,	ejecting,	“Contact!	Contact!,”	as	he	begins	to	comprehend	that	he	has	just	come	
across	some	being,	some	entity,	radically	different	from	himself.	In	this	moment,	
nature	maintains	a	distinct	separation,	a	sense	of	difference	from	Thoreau	that	
forces	him	to	recognize	what	he	does	not,	and	may	not	ever,	understand	about	this	
entity	before	him.	Describing	how	Thoreau’s	experience	may	redefine	the	
problematic	self-validating	third	phase	of	the	sublime,	Hitt	sees	in	Thoreau	“a	new	
way	of	imagining	‘transcendence,’”	in	which,	“by	crossing	the	threshold	of	discursive	
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conceptualization,	the	speaker	transcends	logos.”	More	explicitly,	“a	sublime	
encounter	with	nature	seems	to	have	the	power	to	jolt	us	momentarily	out	of	a	
perspective	constructed	by	reason	and	language,	a	perspective	that,	in	modern	
Western	culture,	has	rendered	nature	mute”	(Hitt	616-617).	Instead	of	
transcendence	over	nature,	as	seen	in	Wordsworth,	Thoreau	experiences	a	
transcendence	over	his	own	logos,	rendering	him	momentarily	free	of	a	world	
trapped	and	labeled	by	language.	He	begins	to	question,	“Who	are	we?	Where	are	
we?,”	as	he	recognizes	a	different	way	of	being:	nature.	Nature	presents	Thoreau	
with	a	way	of	existing	so	vastly	different	from	his	own	that	he	cannot	do	anything	
but	question	his	definitions	of	existence	and	presence.	Without	that	“perspective	
constructed	by	reason	and	language,”	we	can	begin	to	see	nature	on	its	own	terms,	
as	an	entity	with	different	modes	of	communication,	not	lesser	modes.		
	 Along	those	lines,	Damien	Smith	Pfister,	in	“A	Short	Burst	of	Inconsequential	
Information:	Networked	Rhetorics,	Avian	Consciousness,	and	Bioegalitarianism,”	
works	with	Don	DeLillo’s	story,	The	Body	Artist,	exploring	the	ways	in	which	Mr.	
Tuttle’s	strange	way	of	being	in	the	world	(akin	to	autism,	although	not	diagnosed	in	
the	novel)	can	represent	“Contact!”	with	nature,	in	that	it	recognizes	new	forms	of	
perception	as	communication.	Because,	“Despite	the	difficulties	in	communicating	
through	representational	speech,	Lauren	and	Mr.	Tuttle	share	a	series	of	corporeal	
moments	of	identification,	hinting	at	how	affectability	needs	no	logos”	(Pfister	129).	
Much	like	Thoreau	transcending	his	own	logos,	Lauren	had	to	move	beyond	her	own	
definitions	of	language	and	communication	to	find	a	way	to	identify	with	Mr.	Tuttle,	
so	she	turned	to	the	body	as	language.	This	was	a	kind	of	“ontological	realignment,”	
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that,	as	Pfister	quotes	David	Abram,	“rearranges	her	‘common	state	of	
consciousness	precisely	in	order	to	make	contact	with	the	other	organic	forms	of	
sensitivity	and	awareness	with	which	human	existence	is	entwined’”	(Pfister	124).	
Both	Thoreau	and	Lauren	echo	Hitt’s	sense	of	transcendence	over	the	logos,	but	
Lauren	makes	movement	towards	the	next	step:	allowing	that	transcendence	to	
“rearrange	‘common	state[s]	of	consciousness’”	that	open	up	new	forms	and	
pathways	of	communication.	For	Lauren,	the	step	away	from	her	conceived	notions	
of	communication	allows	her	the	opportunity	to	communicate	in	a	new	way	with	a	
person	or	entity	that	was	previously	unreachable.		
	 Although	Thoreau	seems	closely	related	to	Lauren	in	transcendence,	he	
doesn’t	make	the	final	leap	towards	connecting	with	nature.	Instead,	he	clings	to	
nature’s	otherness,	relishing	it	as	an	escape	from	the	human	world.	In	the	chapter,	
“The	Village,”	of	his	great	work,	Walden,	Thoreau	shamelessly	mocks	the	village	for	
its	trivialities,	and	commends	himself	for	his	quiet	life	in	the	woods:		
I	was	even	accustomed	to	make	an	irruption	into	some	houses,	where	
I	was	well	entertained,	and	after	learning	the	kernels	and	very	last	
sieveful	of	news	—	what	had	subsided,	the	prospects	of	war	and	
peace,	and	whether	the	world	was	likely	to	hold	together	much	longer	
—	I	was	let	out	through	the	rear	avenues,	and	so	escaped	to	the	
woods	again.	(Walden	184)	
Note	the	sarcasm	in	the	hyperbole,	“whether	the	world	was	likely	to	hold	together	
much	longer,”	as	he	makes	fun	of	the	gossip	of	the	village	people.	To	him,	they	talk	
about	any	and	all	things,	speculating	on	so	grand	a	scale	as	“if	the	world	will	
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continue	on”.	In	essence,	they	talk	of	nothing	of	substance	or	of	value,	instead	
finding	themselves	left	with	exaggerated	gossip	and	histrionic	ideas	about	the	
world.	Unable	to	remain	in	that	sort	of	company	for	long,	he	“escapes”	from	this	
madness	to	the	woods.		
The	notion	of	“escaping”	to	the	wilderness	identifies	nature	as	“other,”	a	
place	inexorably	separate	from	humanity.	Essentially,	the	mindset	of	nature	as	an	
“escape”	blocks	that	very	nature	from	Thoreau.	Instead,	he	is	projecting	the	frontier	
myth,	the	story	that	“By	fleeing	to	the	outer	margins	of	settled	land	and	society—so	
the	story	ran—an	individual	could	escape	the	confining	strictures	of	civilized	life”	
(Cronon	77).	He	creates	nature	in	the	image	of	“not-culture,”	a	place	where	he	is	
separate	and	free	from	the	annoying	trivialities	he	sees	in	the	village.	But	in	doing	
so,	he	becomes	like	“elite	urban	tourists	and	wealthy	sportsmen”	who	“projected	
their	leisure-time	frontier	fantasies	onto	the	American	landscape	and	so	created	
wilderness	in	their	own	image”	(Cronon	79).	In	Thoreau’s	nature	the	wilderness	
was	a	place	where	life	was	lived	well,	better	and	separate	from	the	city	life	he	
mocked.	He	created	a	wilderness	that	was	entirely	separate	from	notions	of	
humanity	and	culture,	a	place	where	he	could	learn	the	secrets	to	life	his	fellow	
humans	were	missing.	He	admits,	“I	do	not	propose	to	write	an	ode	to	dejection,	but	
to	brag	as	lustily	as	chanticleer	in	the	morning,	standing	on	his	roost,	if	only	to	wake	
my	neighbors	up”	(Walden	90).	He	went	to	the	woods	to	learn	about	how	to	live,	and	
to	relate	that	knowledge	to	his	neighbors,	hoping	to	share	his	enlightenment.	For	
him,	nature	lacked	the	human	traits,	the	humanity,	that	bothered	him	about	city	life	
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and	thus	it	could	teach	him	how	to	really	live,	not	the	way	his	fellow	humans	were	
so	thoughtlessly	doing	it.		
However,	this	canyon-like	divide	creates	a	dangerous	duality.	No	longer	was	
nature	simply	nature,	but	instead	an	area	of	“not-culture.”	Even	worse,	nature	no	
longer	had	its	own	definitions,	but	simply	mirrored	and	provided	the	answers	
Thoreau	was	looking	for,	the	same	way	Wordsworth	use	nature.	From	his	chapter,	
“The	Bean	Field,”	we	see	what	he	learned	from	his	beans:		
This	further	experience	also	I	gained:	I	said	to	myself,	I	will	not	
plant	beans	and	corn	with	so	much	industry	another	summer,	but	
such	seeds,	if	the	seed	is	not	lost,	as	sincerity,	truth,	simplicity,	
faith,	innocence,	and	the	like,	and	see	if	they	will	not	grow	in	this	
soil,	even	with	less	toil	and	manure,	and	sustain	me,	for	surely	it	
has	not	been	exhausted	for	these	crops.	(Walden	178)	
The	beans	take	on	a	meaning	larger	than	themselves,	becoming	a	metaphor	for	
cultivating	the	seeds	of	virtue	in	oneself.	In	doing	so,	Thoreau	takes	away	the	voice	
of	the	beans	and	inserts	his	own,	projecting	what	he	wants	to	learn	from	them	onto	
them,	thus	“create[ing]	wilderness	in	[his]	own	image”	like	the	elite	tourists	Cronon	
describes.	While	I	believe	he	sees	himself	as	giving	voice	to	the	message	and	secrets	
nature	contains,	in	actuality	he	doesn’t	listen	at	all,	using	nature	as	a	mouthpiece	for	
his	own	thoughts	and	ideas.		
									Bryan	Lee	Moore,	in	“Ecocentric	Personification	in	American	Nature	Writing,”	
seems	to	call	attention	to	this	when	he	discusses	Thoreau’s	“inverted	
personifications:”	“metaphors	that	give	humans	the	qualities	of	the	natural	world”	
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(Moore	95).	Moore	frames	this	use	of	personification	in	a	positive	light,	describing	
how	it	allows	Thoreau	to	connect	more	deeply	with	the	natural	world.	I	disagree	
with	his	assumption	that	this	creates	a	closer	connection	with	nature,	rather	than	
furthering	the	divide.	Thoreau	uses	this	“inverse	personification”	to	translate	what	
he	learns	from	nature	to	the	human	realm.	He	wants	to	“brag	as	lustily	as	
chanticleer	in	the	morning”	and	“plant	[…]	such	seeds	[…]	as	sincerity,	truth,	
simplicity.”	He	frequently	defines	the	human	world	in	terms	of	the	natural,	but	does	
so	only	to	describe	how	nature	has	taught	him	to	live	as	a	human,	never	to	connect	
more	concretely	with	nature	or	establish	kinship.	As	such,	Moore	misses	the	
anthropocentrism	of	Thoreau’s	personification,	how	it	only	serves	to	disconnect	him	
further,	becoming	a	tool	to	turn	nature	itself	into	a	series	of	didactic	phrases.	The	
use	of	the	natural	images	in	his	work	does	not	reveal	Thoreau’s	close	understanding	
of	and	connection	with	nature,	it	only	reveals	his	fervent	searching	for	images	that	
connect	his	own	thoughts	with	natural	scenes.	Thoreau	wants	to	see	his	own	
thoughts	and	ideas	mirrored	in	the	natural	world.		
	 Vaguely	reminiscent	of	the	selfishness	of	Wordsworth,	Thoreau	goes	into	
nature	to	find	exactly	what	he’s	looking	for.	For	Wordsworth,	it	was	validation	of	his	
own	intellect.	For	Thoreau,	it	is	teachings	on	how	to	live	well	(which	I’m	presuming	
he	figured	out	with	intellect,	making	him	not	so	different	from	Wordsworth).	Both	
writers	saw	in	nature	the	message	they	wanted;	they	didn’t	listen,	but	used	it	as	a	
springboard	for	their	own	ideas.	In	that	way,	they	silenced	nature.	Nature	wasn’t	
allowed	any	individuality,	or	agency,	but	remained	a	mute	mirror	for	each	writer	to	
see	what	they	needed	to	see.	Thoreau’s	sublime	moment	got	him	close	to	a	sense	of	
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recognizing	the	value	of	nature’s	otherness	and	learning	to	listen	to	it,	as	Lauren	did	
with	Mr.	Tuttle.	But	instead	he	expanded	the	otherness	and	used	that	as	a	place	to	
seek	out	lessons,	to	learn	how	to	live,	and	take	his	learning	back	to	the	“real	world.”	
Nature	becomes	so	opposite	from	humanity	that	is	the	antithesis,	all	that	humanity	
is	not,	and,	for	Thoreau,	a	better	place	for	humanity	to	learn	from.	While	that	seems	
like	a	positive	view,	it	creates	a	divide	wherein	nature	doesn’t	exist	in	its	own	right,	
but	only	exists	as	the	opposite	of	“culture,”	or	humans.	In	that	existence,	nature	
exists	only	to	teach	humanity	better	ways	of	living	and	doing.	From	this	point	of	
view,	nature	has	lost	an	individuality	or	voice.	Instead,	it	is	swathed	in	
anthropocentric	ideas	of	what	can	be	found	in	nature	and	what	that	nature	might	
say—ignoring	any	notion	that	nature	might	be	capable	of	thought	independent	from	
human	exploration.		
	 But,	all	is	not	lost.	A	more	contemporary	poet,	Wislawa	Syzmborska	has	written	
a	poem	that	both	describes	the	problem	of	communicating	with	nature	and	
acknowledges	the	dangers	of	anthropocentric	communication.	Her	poem,	
“Conversation	with	a	Stone,”	consists	of	a	conversation,	but	more	of	an	argument,	
between	a	human	trying	to	enter	into	a	stone	and	the	stone	refusing	to	let	the	
human	enter.	The	person	in	the	poem	is	reminiscent	of	the	voice	of	Thoreau	and	
Wordsworth:	“’It’s	only	me,	let	me	come	in./	I	want	to	enter	your	insides,/	have	a	
look	around,/	breathe	my	fill	of	you’”	(1-4).	Much	like	the	two	earlier	writers,	the	
person	in	this	poem	wants	to	enter	into	the	heart	of	nature	and	see	all,	learn	what	
they	can.	Especially	with	the	phrase,	“breathe	my	fill	of	you,”	the	person	assumes	a	
	 	 Smith	13	
superior	tone,	as	if	they	have	the	right	to	simply	walk	into	nature,	take	their	fill,	and	
then	exit	again	into	the	“real,”	or	human,	world.		
	 An	interesting	type	of	personification	is	also	at	work	here.	From	the	first,	the	
stone	is	created	in	the	image	of	a	large	palace,	with	a	“front	door”	(1)	to	knock	at	and	
“great	empty	halls”	(26)	to	walk	around	in.	Although	the	stone	is	clearly	a	natural	
element,	the	speaker	turns	it	into	something	familiar	and	comfortable:	a	house.	
Personification	is	normally	taking	an	inanimate	or	non-human	element	and	giving	it	
human	traits.	A	house	is	not	human,	but	it	certainly	isn’t	natural,	either.	This	is	more	
like	“culturefication,”	wherein	the	human	takes	a	natural	element	and	gives	it	more	
familiar	traits,	such	as	those	generally	associated	with	culture,	human	life,	or	the	
opposite	of	the	natural	realm.	Speaking	of	personification	and	anthropomorphism,	
Moore	writes,	“It	was	not,	however,	until	Thoreau	that	American	writers	began	to	
characterize	the	value	of	wilderness	by	giving	the	wilderness	human	qualities	which	
show	that	the	untamed	wild(er)ness	is	an	inextricable	part	of	humanity”	(Moore	
29).	Although	he	directs	this	towards	the	writing	of	Thoreau,	the	sentiment	is	
maintained	throughout	his	paper:	personification	provides	closer	contact	with	
nature.	He	asserts	that	through	personification	we	can	find	greater	kinship	with	
nature	by	finding	that	the	“wild(er)ness”	in	nature	bears	resemblance	to	ourselves.	
However,	this	avoids	the	very	fact	that	by	placing	human	traits	on	the	natural	world,	
we	invariably	cover	it	up,	masking	the	truth	of	it	with	human	traits.	Personification	
then	also	assumes	a	far	greater	understanding	of	nature,	assuming	we	are	able	to	
find	such	parallel	traits.	That	assumption	also	denies	nature	a	respectable	
“otherness,”	a	sense	that	we	can’t	penetrate	and	understand	all	of	it.	The	very	
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similar	“culturefication”	ignores	any	pretense	of	finding	parallels	and	simply	jumps	
to	mask	the	uncomfortable	differences	by	placing	the	unfamiliar	natural	element	in	
human	terms	and	conditions.	Both	literary	devices	push	nature	away--	assuming	
understanding	across	individual	boundaries	and	covering	up	differences	that	make	
understanding	difficult.		
	 There’s	also	the	more	blatant	personification:	the	stone	is	talking.	What’s	
interesting,	though,	is	what	the	stone	says.	The	stone	never	seems	to	give	too	much	
away,	never	seems	to	say	more	than	a	human	could	rightly	know	about	nature.	In	
fact,	the	stone’s	words	discuss	how	inconsiderate	it	really	is	to	assume	that	human	
language	is	the	best	(or	only)	way	to	communicate	with	nature.	Perhaps	Moore	has	
a	point:	a	more	honest,	respecting	personification	can	help	to	give	a	real,	less	
anthropocentric,	voice	to	a	nature	that	communicates	in	other	ways.		
	 However,	the	fact	that	the	stone	is	talking	about	how	it	really	can’t	talk	calls	
upon	the	elegant	use	of	irony	throughout	the	poem.	Szymborska	makes	her	point	by	
satirizing	the	senseless	ironies	that	play	out	in	our	interactions	with	nature.	And	one	
of	the	main	ironies	is	our	sense	of	personification.	The	stone	says,	“I	don’t	have	the	
muscles	to	laugh,”	(23)	but	by	the	end	of	the	poem	is	“bursting	from	laughter,	yes,	
laughter”	(62).	Although	nature,	the	stone,	frequently	reminds	us	that	it	doesn’t	
indeed	laugh,	or	have	these	human	traits,	it	is	still	personified,	still	“laughing.”	The	
stone	is	communicating	the	only	way	it	knows	how	and	the	human	speaker	isn’t	
listening.	Szymborska	creates	this	tension	between	the	stone	and	the	speaker	by	
having	the	stone	insist	it	can’t	laugh,	and	then	having	it	laugh	at	the	naivety	of	the	
speaker.	Essentially,	Szymborska	has	created	a	created	a	conversation	in	which	two	
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entities	talk	at	each	other,	but	never	communicate.	The	irony	here	shows	that	if	we	
aren’t	willing	to	listen,	which	is	one-half	of	communication,	we	will	continue	to	see	
nature	how	we	want	to	see	it:	“laughing,”	and	it	still	won’t	know	how	to	laugh.		
	 Another	major	irony	that	Szymborska	deals	with	is	the	“culturefication”	of	the	
stone,	and	its	refusal	to	be	seen	that	way.	Repeated	six	times	throughout	the	poem,	
the	person	constantly	“knocks	at	the	stone’s	front	door,”	trying	to	enter	the	nature-
as-palace	they	have	chosen	to	see.	And,	in	a	line	that	many	have	said	is	damning,	the	
stone	simply	says,	“I	don’t	have	a	door”	(66).	Instead	of	damning,	this	is	the	shining	
moment	of	the	stone.	All	along	the	person	has	been	trying	to	enter	nature	in	a	way	
that	they	find	comfortable	and	familiar,	through	the	front	door,	but	then,	in	the	
ultimate	irony,	the	stone	asserts	it	doesn’t	even	have	a	front	door	to	enter	through.	
In	this	moment	the	stone	refuses	to	remain	in	the	nature-as-palace	image	the	person	
has	created	and	demands	to	be	seen	for	what	it	is:	a	stone.	Szymborska	here	is	
pointing	out	the	blatant	irony	of	trying	to	place	human	qualities	and	traits	upon	
something	that	clearly	isn’t	human,	and	then	being	surprised	when	they	don’t	work.	
We	have	to	redefine	the	way	we	approach	nature	if	we	want	to	finally	understand	it;	
or	else	we	will	just	be	pounding	on	a	door	that	doesn’t	exist.		
	 Thankfully,	Szymborska	hints	at	those	new	forms	of	communication	in	her	
poem.	What	she	gets	close	to	is	a	view	of	language,	or	communication,	that	is	better	
seen	through	the	lens	of	eco-phenomenology.	After	once	more	asking	the	stone	is	
she	might	come	in	to	its	“great	empty	halls,”	the	stone	refuses	and	then	adds,	
speaking	of	its	insides,	“Beautiful,	perhaps,	but	not	to	the	taste/	of	your	poor	senses”	
(32-33).	This	is	vital	because	it	implies	that	communication	is	possible,	but	that	at	
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the	moment	we	have	dulled	our	senses	to	what	nature	might	have	to	offer	us.	And	
perhaps,	as	Maurice	Merleau-Ponty	has	put	forth	in	The	Visible	and	the	Invisible,	
there	is	another	sense	we	aren’t	tapping	into:	
“The	flesh	is	not	matter,	is	not	mind,	is	not	substance.	To	designate	it,	
we	should	need	the	old	term	“element,”	in	the	sense	it	was	used	to	
speak	of	water,	air,	earth,	and	fire,	that	is,	in	the	sense	of	a	general	
thing,	midway	between	the	spatio-temporal	individual	and	the	idea,	a	
sort	of	incarnate	principle	that	brings	a	style	of	being	wherever	this	is	
a	fragment	of	being.	The	flesh	is	in	this	sense	an	“element”	of	Being.”	
(139)	
The	entire	planet	of	being	(in	which	inanimate	objects	are	not	excluded)	is	
connected	by	a	“flesh-of-the-world,”	providing	a	more	physical	interaction.	The	
stone	is	chastising	the	human	for	her	“poor	senses,”	her	inability	to	see	beyond	
human	experience.	The	stone	continues:	“You	lack	the	sense	of	taking	part./	No	
other	sense	can	make	up	for	your	missing	sense	of	taking	part”	(48-49).	What	this	
implies	is	that	there	is	a	sort	of	fifth	element	or	sixth	sense	that	humans	aren’t	
tapping	into,	another	way	of	knowing	the	world	that	could	provide	larger	definitions	
of	interchange	or	communication	between	beings.	This	element	or	sense	is	Merleau-
Ponty’s	“flesh.”	Note	the	way	the	stone	describes	this	sense:	it	is	a	“taking	part,”	an	
sense	that	involves	actively	participating	with	the	recipient.	The	“flesh”	is	that	
interaction,	a	“taking	part”	in	the	large	interchange	of	all	the	beings	in	the	world,	
including	more	than	just	the	human	elements.	But	how	can	humans	tap	into	this	
world?	The	stone	tells	her,	“You	have	only	a	sense	of	what	that	sense	should	be,/	
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one	its	seed,	imagination”	(Szymborska	52-53).	With	imagination	humans	can	begin	
to	step	outside	the	human	experience;	it	is	our	small	way	of	imagining	another	
being.	However,	it	is	just	the	seed	and	it	isn’t	enough	to	fully	accept	the	being-ness	of	
what	human	experience	calls	inanimate,	or	non-human.	If	we	can’t	move	beyond	
imagining,	and	start	believing	and	listening,	we	won’t	be	able	to	feel	ourselves	as	
part	of	a	larger	flesh,	a	connection	with	the	rest	of	the	world.		
	 The	stone’s	sense	of	“taking	part”	also	redefines	the	subject/object	binary	
created	for	a	nature	that	only	functions	as	a	backdrop	or	destination	for	poets	
seeking	enlightenment.	In	those	scenarios,	nature	is	the	object,	being	passively	
viewed,	analyzed,	and	interpreted.	But,	for	Merleau-Ponty,	“sensation	is	not	an	
invasion	of	the	sensor	by	the	sensible.	[…]	and	in	this	transaction	between	the	
subject	of	sensation	and	the	sensible	it	cannot	be	held	that	one	acts	while	the	other	
suffers	the	action,	or	that	one	confers	significance	on	the	other”	(Phenomenology	of	
Perception	248).	The	flesh,	or	“taking	part,”	places	both	participants	on	an	equal	
field,	perceiving	each	other	at	the	same	time.	This	allows	for	each	being	to	have	
agency	and	power;	they	have	a	certain	“Thing-Power:	the	curious	ability	of	
inanimate	things	to	animate,	to	act,	to	produce	effects	dramatic	and	subtle”	(Bennett	
6).	While	Bennett	is	more	exclusively	discussing	inanimate	objects,	I	think	her	
Thing-Power	applies	to	all	of	nature,	a	normally	silent	entity	dispossessed	of	its	
power.	And	if	nature,	the	stone,	has	Thing-Power,	if	it	is	“vibratory”	(Bennett	5),	
then	it	is	entirely	capable	of	existing	in	an	equitable	exchange	of	perception	with	
human	beings	or	any	other	entity--	giving	it	a	voice.		
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	 The	nature	of	that	voice	is	very	different	from	conventional	ideas	of	language	
defined	by	human	beings.	And	I	think	that’s	the	point.	The	“literacy	myth,”	as	
defined	by	James	Paul	Gee,	is	somewhat	at	fault	for	the	power-hierarchy	associated	
with	language:	“literacy	has	seemed	to	many	people	something	the	possession	of	
which	makes	people	better	and	higher	human	beings.	Literate	people	are,	it	is	
widely	believed,	more	intelligent,	more	modern,	more	moral”	(Gee	47).	As	a	linguist,	
he	isn’t	dealing	with	language	and	literacy	beyond	the	human	realm,	but	the	point	is	
clear:	literacy	makes	you	better,	smarter,	and	more	powerful.	Think	of	it,	he’s	not	
only	talking	about	language,	but	literacy,	so	the	lack	of	even	language	places	a	being	
incredibly	low	on	the	hierarchy.	Without	language,	nature	isn’t	even	considered,	and	
without	literacy	it	won’t	be	taken	seriously.	But	this	is	an	incredibly	anthropocentric	
view	of	communication.	The	stone	says,	“I	don’t	have	a	door,”	refusing	to	be	placed	
in	the	easily-defined	human	realm,	and	therefore	demanding	to	be	taken	on	its	own	
terms.	Nature	shouldn’t	have	to	prove	that	it	can	exist	in	a	human	world,	it	should	
be	understood	as	it	exists	in	its	own	world.	This	also	allows	it	the	healthy	otherness	
that	comes	from	maintaining	its	own	secrets,	not	being	completely	comprehended	
and	conquered	by	human	understanding.	The	stone	acknowledges	the	importance	
of	that	mystery,	saying	to	the	speaker,	“My	whole	surface	is	turned	toward	you,/	all	
my	insides	turned	away”	(35-36).	The	sentiment	here	is	perfectly	echoed	by	David	
Abram:	“Like	the	bowl,	each	presence	presents	some	facet	that	catches	my	eye	while	
the	rest	of	it	lies	hidden	behind	the	horizon	of	my	current	position”	(Abram	52).	
When	the	more-than-human-realm	(to	borrow	a	term	from	Abram)	is	treated	as	an	
entity,	a	being,	it	becomes	less	fathomable,	an	individual	that	is	only	perceivable	
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from	certain	angles	at	certain	times,	hiding	the	rest	of	itself	from	view.	In	this	way	it	
maintains	the	power	of	its	secrets,	the	way	we	accept	our	inability	to	ever	truly	
understand	and	know	another	human	perfectly.	The	courtesy	that	comes	from	
accepting	the	individuality	of	another	mind,	or	existence,	and	accepting	its	
otherness	is	the	exact	way	in	which	we	recognize	the	consciousness	and	vitality	of	
another	human.	When	science,	or	poets,	seek	to	understand	nature	in	its	totality,	
they	deprive	it	of	that	courtesy,	that	sense	of	its	individual	mind,	soul,	or	
consciousness.	As	the	stone	reminds	the	speaker,	“You	may	get	to	know	me	but	
you’ll	never	know	me	through”	(34).		
	 Once	this	understanding	has	been	reached,	a	new	sense	of	communication	
can	be	utilized.	Working	towards	that,	Abram	takes	Merleau-Ponty’s	works	and	ties	
it	directly	to	nature,	speaking	of	a	“reciprocity,	the	ongoing	interchange	between	my	
body	and	the	entities	that	surround	it”	(Abram	52).	What	is	important	about	this	
interchange	is	that	it	is	“a	sort	of	silent	conversation”	that	“unfolds	far	below	my	
verbal	awareness”	(Abram	52).	The	stone	does	not	have	a	door	and	it	cannot	
laugh—it	does	not	function	in	an	anthropocentric	world.	But	that	doesn’t	mean	we	
are	inexorably	divided	from	nature.	Learning	to	understand	physicality,	a	corporeal	
language,	can	move	us	towards	a	new	way	of	communicating	with	nature.	As	of	now,	
nature	is	silent.	Like	Gee’s	literacy	myth	suggests,	we	have	assumed	that	without	
language	nature	can	have	no	power	or	voice.	Once	it	has	an	individuality,	a	mind,	
once	that	has	been	accepted,	it	can	have	a	voice.	But	it	won’t	be	on	our	terms.	On	a	
perceptual	level	we	can	begin	to	respond	to	nature’s	physical	nudges,	learn	to	listen	
without	expecting	verbal	language.	It	has	Thing-Power;	it	is	connected	to	us	through	
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the	flesh-of-the-world.	It	can	function	in	reciprocity	with	us.	We	may	not	learn	its	
language,	we	may	not	fully	understand	it,	but	it	can	communicate	with	us;	it	can	
touch	us.	
	 What	Szymborska’s	poem	does	is	redefine	the	way	nature	can	be	written	
about,	opening	up	new	ways	to	view	the	relationship.	But	I	want	to	make	sure	that	
nature’s	otherness	isn’t	alienating;	making	sure	that	in	trying	to	maintain	nature’s	
individuality	we	don’t	disconnect	our	kinship	to	it.	It’s	important	that	we	learn	to	
feel	at	home	in	the	new	flesh-of-the-world,	and	begin	to	understand,	perhaps,	what	
Bartholomew	Walsh	calls	“whole-nature.”	He	makes	the	case	for	tying	together	
science	and	eco-phenomenology	to	become	more	open.	To	him,	“Being	open	simply	
means	letting	some	aspect	of	reality	show	itself	intelligibly,	bringing	it	near	through	
regular	engagement,	coming	to	feel	at	home	in	a	certain	domain”	(Walsh	2).	If	we	
are	open,	then	“knowledge	and	experience	[can]	open	us	to	nature’s	fully	depths”	
and	train	the	body	“to	become	aware,	sensitive,	and	wide	open	to	receive	the	land’s	
phenomenological	richness”	(Walsh	2).	Bringing	us	back	to	the	“flesh,”	Walsh	urges	
a	greater	sensitivity	to	the	direct	experience	of	nature,	the	physicality	of	that	
communication.	Although	at	times	science	can	seek	to	extract	from	nature,	it	also	
focuses	on	the	hands-on	aspect	of	nature,	experimenting	and	observing.	Perhaps	
through	a	kind	of	science	that	focuses	on	“whole-nature,”	or	truly	understanding	
and	coming	close	to	nature,	we	can	begin	to	seek	comprehension	and	not	natural	
resources.	
	 Poets	are	moving	towards	a	better	sense	of	how	to	write	about	their	
conversations	with	nature,	and	a	better	way	to	represent	nature	in	those	
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conversations.	William	Wordsworth	represented	nature	as	a	place	to	find	himself,	a	
mirror	for	his	own	intellect.	Henry	David	Thoreau	drew	a	slightly	more	complicated	
picture,	at	times	giving	nature	its	due	and	more	often	than	not	finding	in	nature	a	
place	of	enlightenment,	not	an	individual.	But,	with	her	finely	written	poem,	
“Conversation	with	a	Stone,”	Wislawa	Szymborska	has	started	to	redefine	what	a	
nature	poem	might	look	like,	depicting	a	nature	that	doesn’t	always	say	what	we	
want	to	hear.	This	is	a	first	step	in	giving	nature	an	individual	mind,	an	entity	that	
can	have	agency,	and	therefore	communicate.	When	it	is	understood	on	its	own	
terms,	as	an	entity	different	from	ourselves,	the	definitions	of	language	and	
communication	change	too.	Experiencing	nature	and	feeling	the	physicality	as	a	
form	of	communication	become	tools	for	understanding	nature’s	ability	to	enact	
change	on	ourselves,	its	Thing-Power.	As	such,	the	communicability	of	nature	begins	
to	exist,	and	nature	begins	to	have	a	voice.		
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